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INTRODUCTION: FIRST DAY ON THE JOB
In September 2015, Steve Lopez, a Los Angeles Times reporter,
opened the Uber app for the first time and embarked on his first day as an
Uber driver.1 After a moment of the “rookie jitters,” Steve picked up his
first customer, Eloisa Lopez, whose destination was downtown Los
Angeles.2 On his first day, Steve drove from 9 a.m. until 5 p.m. and again
after 9 p.m.3 He drove a singer, several songwriters, a therapist, a radio
executive, and a University of Southern California graduate.4 His patrons
were enthusiastic about the convenience of Uber because it allowed them
to drink without worrying about driving, arrive at their destinations
without searching for parking, and pay electronically without needing
cash.5 Steve, however, was not as satisfied as his customers. He broke
down his earnings for the day and found that he made only $12.22 an hour
after deducting Uber’s cut of the fares and the cost of gas.6 The total did
not account for the cost of car insurance or the wear and tear on his car. 7
Steve ultimately decided that Uber was great for passengers but “yet
another industry that might one day make a few people staggeringly rich
on the backs of workers who struggle to eke out a living wage[.]”8
Recently, the American workforce has shifted toward a new demand
for “gig workers,” like Uber and Lyft drivers, who use smartphone
applications to engage in on-demand services.9 The MBO Partners, a
privately owned business that assists independent contractors and those
that employ them,10 created an Independent Workforce Index to track the
Copyright 2019, by BROOKE C. BAHLINGER.
1. Steve Lopez, After Driving for Uber, he’s keeping his day job, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-0920-lopezuber-20150920-column.html [https://perma.cc/4U88-6K8V].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. SARAH A. DONOVAN, DAVID H. BRADLEY & JON O. SHIMABUKURO,
WHAT DOES THE GIG ECONOMY MEAN FOR WORKERS? (Cong. Research Serv.
2016).
10. About MBO Partners, MBO PARTNERS, http://www.mbopartners.com/
about [https://perma.cc/E8R8-NANV] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). The MBO
Partners was created to assist independent contractors and businesses that employ
independent contractors in building and maintaining successful work
relationships. Part of MBO Partners’ mission statement is to see most of
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gig worker sector’s growth and reported that the number of gig workers
rose by 8.2% in 2011, 2.7% in 2012, and is expected to increase.11 As of
2016, there were 3.8 million gig workers in America.12 The MBO Partners
describe the rise of gig-related jobs as a “structural shift” in the workforce
rather than “a blip[] in the jobs economy.”13 These gig workers, including
the rideshare industry, are part of an emerging job market here to stay.14
Debate surrounds whether the government should classify gig workers
as employees or independent contractors under the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”) and other laws.15 The NLRA governs the
collective bargaining rights of workers classified as employees but excludes
workers classified as independent contractors from coverage.16 If the NLRA
considers rideshare drivers employees, they can engage in collective
bargaining and file unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA to contest
an employer’s unilateral decisions.17 If rideshare drivers are considered
independent contractors, they cannot engage in these actions.18 Instead,

America’s workforce shift towards self-employment. The MBO Partners’
research on gig workers has been published and cited in Fortune, the Washington
Business Journal, and Forbes. Id.
11. MBO Partners, The State of Independence in America, THIRD ANNUAL
INDEPENDENT WORKFORCE REPORT 4 (Sept. 2013), https://www.mbopartners
.com/uploads/files/state-of-independence-reports/2013-MBO_Partners_State_of
_Independence_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHE3-5AJF] (noting that the number
of gig workers “rose yet again: up 2.7% over 2012 and 8.2% over the base year
2011”).
12. Rani Molla, The gig economy workforce will double in four years, RECODE
(May 25, 2017, 12:27 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/5/25/15690106/gig-ondemand-economy-workers-doubling-uber [https://perma.cc/MX4V-CDEU] (“9.2
million Americans are expected to work in the gig economy by 2021 . . . .”).
13. MBO Partners, supra note 11, at 4.
14. See id.
15. Jimmy Frost, Uber and the Gig Economy: Can the Legal World Keep
Up?, 13 No. 2 ABA SCITECH LAW. 4, 5 (Winter 2017).
16. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
17. See generally id.
18. See generally id. § 158(d) (“[T]o bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession . . . .”).
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rideshare drivers would have to organize and attempt to make workplace
changes without NLRA protections and regulations.19
Courts and Congress have failed to properly clarify on drivers’ status,
so drivers’ labor rights are subject to labor regulations that vary from city
to city and state to state,20 leaving many workers without protection.21 If
drivers work in a city that does not allow rideshare workers to unionize,
the drivers must depend on themselves, rather than a union, for protections
against pay changes, terminations, and unilateral employer decisions.22
A recent case from a federal district court in Washington, Clark v. City
of Seattle, highlights the conflicts that occur among federal, state, and local
labor laws when a city permits rideshare drivers, who may be classified as
independent contractors, to unionize.23 Clark focused on a Seattle
ordinance that circumvented the classification debate and declared
rideshare drivers classified as independent contractors can unionize and
engage in collective bargaining.24 The solution to the independent
contractor–employee debate, therefore, is not relevant in Seattle because
either classification results in the same protection of rights to organize and

19. Id. Organizing and bargaining is possible without NLRA coverage, but it is
a difficult and sometimes impossible process because independent contractors lack
NLRA regulations and protections that force the process along. For example, public
sector employees—also excluded from NLRA coverage—make up public sector
unions, but there are major restrictions to the bargaining abilities depending on the
state. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Will the Supreme Court Unravel Public Employee
Unions?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/20
17/10/will-the-supreme-court-unravel-public-employee-unions/542382/ [https://per
ma.cc/WNW3-2NWH].
20. See generally SEATTLE, WA., MUN. CODE ch. 6.310, § 1(A) (2015). This
classification issue also arises under other state and federal labor and employment
laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act. See generally Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
21. See generally MUN. ch. 6.310, § 1(A). The ordinance allows rideshare
drivers to unionize and drivers working in cities other than Seattle do not have the
same labor protections from employers. Id.
22. See, e.g., Complaint at 6–9, Van v. Rasier, L.L.C., No. 2:17-CV-02550,
2017 WL 1278763 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017).
23. Clark v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0382RSL, 2017 WL 3641908, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017).
24. Id. The city of Seattle foreshadowed that the classification debate in the
courts and Congress will result in rideshare drivers being classified as independent
contractors. The classification debate has not been solved, but Seattle gave
unionization and collective bargaining protections to rideshare drivers in the event
they are classified as independent contractors. Id.
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bargain collectively.25 The NLRA does not preempt local regulation such
as the Seattle Ordinance because independent contractors are excluded
from the NLRA’s scope.26 Thus, local ordinances that regulate rideshare
drivers’ collective bargaining rights allow cities to decide for themselves
whether rideshare workers can unionize.27
Federal regulation of rideshare workers’ collective bargaining rights
would create uniformity and provide important protections for a growing
sector of the American workforce.28 The NLRA’s current definition of
“employee” does not include rideshare drivers, but Congress should
amend the definition to categorize all gig workers as employees.29 The
amendment should have two aims: (1) to recognize rideshare drivers as a
modern part of the American workforce; and (2) to provide regulation for
drivers’ collective bargaining rights.30 Until the NLRA definition of
employee encompasses gig workers, the regulation of rideshare drivers
will be left to local or state governments—and as a result,31 inconsistent
labor protections and unpredictable markets for rideshare drivers.32
National companies, like Uber, will have to accommodate for changed
regulations to avoid litigation or federal and state action, but uniformity
overcomes these variations in the law, replacing confusion with certainty
across the board.
This Comment addresses the advantages of regulating gig workers,
specifically rideshare drivers, at the federal level and demonstrates how an
amendment to the NLRA accomplishes that regulation. Part I explains the
relevant NLRA provisions, focusing on the history of the classification
debate surrounding rideshare drivers and the related balance between
federal, state, and local labor laws. Part II presents Clark v. City of Seattle,
the case challenging the Seattle Ordinance, and analyzes Clark in light of
a current circuit split. Part III discusses the possible NLRA preemption of
the Seattle Ordinance. Part III also suggests that Congress amend the
NLRA’s employee definition to include gig workers and allow collective
25. Id.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
27. See generally SEATTLE, WA., MUN. ch. 6.310, § 1(A) (2015).
28. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68
MD. L. REV. 89, 132–50 (2008).
29. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 152.
30. See, e.g., Council Directive 2008/104, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 327) (EC).
31. See generally MUN. ch. 6.310, § 1(A).
32. Id. Seattle rideshare drivers have labor protections that drivers in cities
without regulations do not. But see Council Directive 2008/104, art. 1, 2008 O.J.
(L 327) (EC) (addressing drivers on the federal level creates uniform protections
for drivers regardless of the city they work in).
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bargaining of gig workers to be regulated at the federal level. This
Comment concludes by advocating for an amendment to the NLRA that
provides necessary federal regulation of rideshare drivers’ collective
bargaining rights.
I. THE CLASSIFICATION DILEMMA
The classification debate begins with the delicate balance of federal,
state, and local labor laws.33 Federal labor laws preempt local regulation
when Congress determines the federal interest in having consistent
governance of employer–employee relationships is greater than the state or
local government interest in regulating labor rights.34 Labor law preemption
is a primarily court-made doctrine, so court interpretations of preemption
are essential to determine the balance between federal, state, and local labor
laws.35
A. History of the NLRA
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA, giving itself the power to
regulate the collective bargaining rights of employees.36 Collective
bargaining is the method labor organizations and employers use to
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment, including pay and
wage, group insurance, seniority benefits, and overtime.37 Congress
enacted the NLRA to encourage collective bargaining between employers

33. Theresa L. Corrada & Roberto L. Corrada, Federal Preemption of State
Employment Laws and Claims, in 16 COLO. PRAC., EMPLOYMENT LAW &
PRACTICE § 14.7 (3d ed.).
34. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v.
Garmon (Garmon), 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (“When it is clear or may fairly be
assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7
of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under §
8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must
yield.”).
35. Corrada & Corrada, supra note 33. The NLRA does not explicitly state
the parameters of labor law preemption. “Unlike ERISA preemption, which is
based on express statutory law, preemption of state law by federal labor laws is a
combination of statutory preemption and court-made doctrine.” Id.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). Collective bargaining “is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.” Id. § 158(d).
37. TERRY L. LEAP, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 7 (1991).
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and employees and to protect workers’ “freedom of association.”38 The
NLRA’s intent was “to resolve differences [between employers and
employees]—to compromise—rather than to engage in protracted
combat.”39 The NLRA also seeks to protect employees who do not wish
to engage in collective bargaining.40 The NLRA regulates collective
bargaining and ensures that employers do not interfere with employees’
right to join a labor organization.41
Section 2 of the NLRA defines a labor organization as an organization
that exists to address employee grievances with their employers.42 A union
is a type of labor organization that organizes employees and facilitates
conversations with employers about working conditions, and workers join
unions to engage in collective bargaining.43 Although unions serve as the
most popular avenue for collective bargaining, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Electromation v. NLRB held that the term “labor
organization” has been broadly construed to include any group that
organizes for purposes of “‘dealing with’ the employer.”44 In
Electromation, the court concluded that action committees the employer
created qualified as labor organizations under the broad construction of
the definition Congress promulgated.45
In addition to defining a labor organization, § 2 defines workers that
fall within NLRA coverage.46 It regulates and protects employees,
circularly defining employees as “any employee” and making it difficult
to determine who is classified as an employee.47 The NLRA’s employee
exclusions, however, are helpful.48 The NLRA specifically defines what
an employee is not: “The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any

38. 29 U.S.C. § 151. Freedom of association means an employee’s right to
join or not join a group that advocates for labor rights. Id.
39. HAROLD W. DAVEY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
32 (1951).
40. Id. at 41 (“[F]ederal law has also sought to protect employees in their right
to refrain from self-organization and collective bargaining if they so desire.”).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
42. Id. § 152(5) (A labor organization is “any organization of any kind . . . in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose . . . of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work”).
43. DAVEY ET AL., supra note 39.
44. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1159 (7th Cir. 1994).
45. Id.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 152.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 152(3).
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individual having the status of an independent contractor . . . .”49 This
defined exclusion removes a significant group of workers from NLRA
coverage.50
In response to the vague definition of employee, courts have
developed several tests to distinguish between independent contractors
and employees.51 There is no concrete distinction between the
classifications, but most jurisprudential tests revolve around the level of
employer control.52 In NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, the
United States Supreme Court applied the common law agency test that
focuses on the employer’s control over the worker’s everyday life and held
that debt agents were employees rather than independent contractors under
the NLRA.53 In a 2017 case, Minnesota Timberwolves Basketball, the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)54 reaffirmed the common law
agency test and held that crew members for a basketball team were
employees rather than independent contractors because their employer
exercised considerable control over their work, and the crew members did
not have any proprietary interest in the team.55 The NLRB, which has
jurisdiction to establish tests that concern labor rights, restated that the
common law agency test is based on the Restatement (Second) Agency
factors, such as skill required, control, and method of payment, with no

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Gray v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 799 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th
Cir. 2015); Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d 1313, 1318
(11th Cir. 2015); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
52. See Gray, 799 F.3d at 1000; Carlson, 787 F.3d at 1318; United Ins. Co.
of Am., 390 U.S. at 256.
53. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 256 (holding that the debt agents were
employees because the debt agents did not have a large amount of decision
making authority; the debt agents performed tasks as part of the company’s
normal operations, the agents were trained by company personnel, and the debt
agents did business under the company’s name).
54. The National Labor Relations Board is the five-member body that
governs labor rights. When a case begins, the Regional Director investigates the
claim and can either report it to an administrative law judge or dismiss the claim.
The administrative law judge then has a formal trial and rules on the claim. The
NLRB hears any appeals, and U.S. courts of appeal hear the appeals from the
NLRB’s decision, with the Supreme Court acting as the last step in the appeal
process. See The NLRB Process, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrbprocess [https://perma.cc/DK2L-LUQJ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
55. Minn. Timberwolves Basketball, LP & Int’l All. of Theatrical Stage
Emp., 365 N.L.R.B. 124 (2017).
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factor standing alone.56 These jurisprudential tests are necessary in the
classification debate because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
applied the test to gig workers.
Even more recently, a judge applied a similar control test to GrubHub
drivers in a California district case.57 In Lawson v. GrubHub, Inc., a
California judge for the Northern District of California held that
GrubHub’s employer correctly classified delivery drivers as independent
contractors.58 The judge applied the Borello test59 to determine employee
or independent contractor status, which includes a variety of secondary
factors such as method of payment and scheduling, but primarily focused
on the control the worker-drivers have over their duties.60 Ultimately, the
judge held that Lawson, a GrubHub delivery driver, was an independent
contractor because he had control over his schedule, and GrubHub
exhibited very little control over where, when, and how Lawson chose to
make his deliveries.61 Similarly, courts would likely classify rideshare
drivers as independent contractors under the Borello test because rideshare
drivers are engaged in a very similar type of work as GrubHub delivery
drivers.62
B. The New Kind of Worker
Gig workers are part of a new American workforce that provide
services to consumers on a job-or-gig basis and have sparked much debate
about their NLRA classification.63 The Congressional Research Service
described a “gig worker” as someone who answers on-demand service
calls from customers using technology-based apps on smartphones.64 The
56. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST.
1958).
57. Lawson v. GrubHub, Inc., No. 15-CV-05128-JSC, 2017 WL 1684964, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2017).
58. Id.
59. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341,
350–51 (1989). To determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor, the Supreme Court of California adopted a multi-factor test that
centers around the element of control. Id. at 354–59. The court determines who
has the “right to control the work.” Id. at 354.
60. Lawson, 2017 WL 1684964, at *1.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Frost, supra note 15.
64. John Utz, What Is A “Gig”? Benefits for Unexpected Employees, PRAC.
LAW. 19, 20 (June 2016), http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep
/articles/TPL1606-Utz_thumb.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3HG-HMYD].
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U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on the classification of Uber and Lyft
drivers,65 and the lower courts have struggled to categorize drivers because
gig workers are unique and new.66 Employee status gives rideshare drivers
NLRA collective bargaining rights, but independent contractor status does
not.67 Independent contractor status requires that rideshare drivers
negotiate with employers on their own.68 Most rideshare companies,
including Uber and Lyft, consider drivers to be independent contractors.69
The rideshare companies benefit if drivers are independent contractors
because the companies can change contract terms—such as pay, surge
times, and commission—at will.70 An Uber driver in a recent California
district court case alleged that Uber unilaterally imposed an “upfront
pricing model” in 2017 that calculated longer routes for drivers, which
resulted in a bigger cut for Uber.71 For example, Uber advertises that it
takes around 25% of the fare, but one driver tracked his fares and
concluded that Uber takes up to 54% at times.72 A rideshare company can
even deactivate a driver from the Uber application, which effectively
eliminates a source of income.73 If drivers are classified as employees
under the NLRA, collective bargaining rights would enable them to
engage in negotiations with rideshare companies to discuss pay, surge
times, commission, and termination issues through unions serving as their
collective bargaining representatives.74 Without collective bargaining, the

65. Pamela A. Izvanariu, Matters Settled but Not Resolved: Worker
Misclassification in the Rideshare Sector, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 133, 172 (2016).
66. Frost, supra note 15.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
68. See, e.g., FREELANCERS UNION, https://www.freelancersunion.org/
[https://perma.cc/EBA6-M962] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
69. Ryan B. Frazier, Sharing is caring: Are Uber, Lyft Drivers independent
contractors?, UTAH EMP. L. LETTER (Oct. 14, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.km
claw.com/newsroom-articles-367.html [https://perma.cc/E7JB-MN8S].
70. Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy Workers Find Both Freedom
and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014
/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-un
certainty.html [https://perma.cc/8DKT-QHCL].
71. Complaint at 6–8, Van v. Rasier, L.L.C., No. 2:17-CV-02550, 2017 WL
1278763 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017).
72. Harry Campbell, What’s the Real Commission that Uber Takes From
Drivers, MAXIMIZING RIDESHARE PROFITS BLOG (July 25, 2016), https://max
imumridesharingprofits.com/whats-real-commision-uber-takes-drivers/ [https://per
ma.cc/JT87-ZLKN].
73. Singer, supra note 70.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
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drivers must rely on their individual contract negotiations with rideshare
companies as opposed to a powerful group effort.75
C. Seattle’s Ordinance: The First of Its Kind
Reporters describe Seattle’s Ordinance 124968 (“Seattle Ordinance”
or “Ordinance”) as the “first of its kind” because it goes beyond the scope
of the NLRA and specifically protects for-hire drivers despite their
independent contractor status.76 In December 2015, Seattle passed the
Ordinance, which gave rideshare drivers who are independent
contractors77 the right to engage in collective bargaining and created an
avenue for them to form bargaining units to negotiate for payment
increases, vehicle safety, and driver input on employer decisions.78 Seattle
passed the Ordinance at a time of intense nationwide debate between
employers and workers regarding whether rideshare drivers should be
considered independent contractors or employees for union organization
purposes.79 Seattle passed the Ordinance as a part of its power to regulate
transportation within the city and to “protect the public health, safety, and
welfare . . . [by] ensur[ing] safe and reliable transportation services.”80 The
Seattle Ordinance does not classify drivers as independent contractors;
instead, it simply states that those drivers whom the Supreme Court or

75. Collective Bargaining, ALF-CIO, https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do/em
power-workers/collective-bargaining [https://perma.cc/7KAX-LP7U] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2019).
76. Jon Steingart, Seattle Law Allowing Uber, Lyft Drivers to Unionize Is
Blocked, DAILY LAB. REP. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.bna.com/seattle-lawallowing-n73014463849/; Lisa Milam-Perez, Seattle’s Uber organizing
ordinance enjoined for now, EMP. L. DAILY, http://www.employmentlawdaily
.com/index.php/news/seattles-uber-organizing-ordinance-enjoined-for-now/
[https://perma.cc/SFA8-9VD3] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
77. Clark v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0382RSL, 2017 WL 3641908, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017). The Ordinance did not declare that rideshare drivers
are independent contractors; instead, the Directive declares that drivers who are
classified as independent contractors, either by the courts or Congress, can engage
in collective bargaining. Id.
78. Seattle Medium, City of Seattle Implementing For-hire Driver Collective
Bargaining Law, SEATTLE MEDIUM (June 17, 2016), http://seattlemedium.com
/city-seattle-implementing-hire-driver-collective-bargaining-law/
[https://perma.cc/VN2T-LHQJ].
79. Frost, supra note 15.
80. Id.
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Congress may classify as independent contractors in the future can engage
in collective bargaining.81
The Seattle Ordinance authorizes the Seattle Department of Finance
and Administration Services to issue rules that govern these union
organizing efforts.82 Procedurally, the Director of Finance and
Administrative Services, whom the Seattle mayor appoints, acts as the
bargaining process coordinator to ensure that the bargaining agreement
aligns with the city’s goals.83 The Ordinance further gives the Director the
authority to send parties to arbitration when a violation occurs84 and the
ability to assess and enforce consequences for improper conduct.85 The
Seattle Ordinance highlights the continued need for clarity concerning
Uber and Lyft drivers because it oversteps NLRA boundaries by
classifying the drivers as independent contractors upfront.
II. CLARK V. CITY OF SEATTLE STIRS THE POT
A group of for-hire drivers challenged the Seattle Ordinance by
alleging it forced drivers into collective bargaining units and limited the
drivers’ freedom of speech.86 The drivers filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington and argued that the
NLRA, the First Amendment, and the Drivers’ Protection Privacy Act
preempted the Seattle Ordinance—therefore, it was unconstitutional.87
The drivers filed suit after Teamsters Local 117 (“Teamsters”), a
union that supports for-hire drivers,88 notified rideshare companies of its
intention to begin organizing the drivers and hopefully become their
bargaining representative.89 Unions such as Teamsters typically start the
81. SEATTLE, WA., MUN. ch. 6.310, § 1(A) (2015).
82. Id. § 3(I)(3).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 3(M)(1).
86. Complaint at 3, Clark v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0382RSL, 2017 WL
3641908 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017) (“[Ordinance 124968] deprives drivers of
their freedom of speech and compels drivers to associate with an exclusive
representative and its expressive activities . . . .”).
87. Clark, 2017 WL 3641908, at *1.
88. RAISE UP UBER, http://www.raiseupuber.org/ [https://perma.cc/4BDN5F5U] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
89. Clark, 2017 WL 3641908, at *1. The Department of Justice filed an
amicus brief to Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle on November 3, 2017
arguing the Ordinance constitutes price fixing. In Chamber of Commerce v. City
of Seattle, the Chamber of Commerce filed suit against Seattle arguing that federal
law preempts the Ordinance and violates the Sherman Act’s restriction on price
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collective bargaining process by initiating a union-organizing campaign to
gain enough support for a successful certification election.90 The union
must show that at least 30% of that employer’s employees support the
campaign to hold a certification election.91 Teamsters thus sought the
support of local drivers to hold a certification election.92
The plaintiff drivers argued that two sections of the NLRA—§§ 8(e)
and 8(b)(4)—preempted the Seattle Ordinance because the Seattle
Ordinance required drivers to unionize and would eventually force drivers
to abide by a collective bargaining agreement.93 Drivers may not want a
collective bargaining agreement because it could alter their contract terms
contrary to their wishes or force businesses to refuse their services if they
are not part of the collective bargaining unit.94 The first argument was
based on NLRA § 8(e), which states that employers cannot enter into
agreements that prevent the employees from engaging with “any other
person.”95 The district court rejected the § 8(e) argument because no harm
had yet occurred.96 Teamsters had not organized, meaning there was no
union that drivers were being forced to join.97
The plaintiffs’ second argument was that the Seattle Ordinance
violated § 8(b)(4) because it forced the drivers to abide by a collective
bargaining agreement.98 Section 8(b)(4) states that “it [is] an unfair labor
fixing. See Amicus Brief of Department of Justice, Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S. v. City of Seattle, No. C16-0322RSL, 2016 WL 4595981, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 9, 2016).
90. LEAP, supra note 37, at 135. A certification election is the process unions
must go through to gain the right to represent a group of employees. Unions must
show that at least 30% of employees have an interest in voting for the union as
their representative. Id.
91. Certification Election, REP. PHIL. BUREAU LAB., http://blr.dole.gov.ph/20
14/12/11/certification-election/ [https://perma.cc/7U7R-K9PB] (last visited Feb.
7, 2019).
92. Clark, 2017 WL 3641908, at *1.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *2, *6.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2012) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor
organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or
implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from
handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of
any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any
contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an
agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible [sic] and void . . . .”).
96. Clark, 2017 WL 3641908, at *1.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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practice for a labor organization to ‘threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
engaged in commerce . . . .’”99 Although § 8(b)(4) does not require an
agreement before a conflict arises, the court ruled that the conflict with the
Seattle Ordinance was not ripe for suit because the drivers had not been
“injured.”100 It was unclear if Teamsters would unionize and what effect it
would have if the drivers chose to join; therefore, the court reasoned the
drivers had no cause of action.101
The court also struck down the plaintiffs’ argument that including
independent contractors made the Seattle Ordinance unconstitutional.102
Ultimately, the court based its decision on state law, but the court dismissed
this argument because the controlling Ninth Circuit allowed the unionization
of public employees, a group of workers the NLRA also excludes.103
Notable, however, is the distinction between public employees and
independent contractors—although independent contractors are specifically
excluded from the definition of employee, the NLRA excludes public
employees by excluding public employers rather than employees.104 The
groups are different, but the Washington court concluded the difference was
irrelevant and dismissed the plaintiff’s preemption claim because the
NLRA’s labor organization definition is “unambiguous.”105 If the NLRA
does not include or specifically excludes a group from NLRA protections,
the NLRA does not preempt the regulation because the group does not
constitute a labor organization.106 Two days after the final judgment, the
plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit.107 On August 9, 2018, a three-judge
panel for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s ruling that the NLRA and
First Amendment claims were not ripe for suit.108
Clark raises two important issues. The first is whether the NLRA
preempts the Seattle Ordinance and the inherent conflicts between federal,
state, and local labor laws that regulate independent contractors. The

99. Id. at *2 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. Local 63, Int’l Longshoremen’s &
Warehousemen’s Union (Pacific Maritime), 198 F.3d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999)).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 152.
105. Clark, 2017 WL 3641908, at *2.
106. Id.
107. See id., appeal filed, No. 17-35693 (Aug. 26, 2017).
108. Clark v. City of Seattle, 899 F.3d 802, 808–13 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding
that the drivers did not establish an injury-in-fact concerning their NLRA or First
Amendment claims).
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second issue is whether regulation of for-hire drivers should occur at the
federal, state, or local level.109
A. Preemption and Its Effect on Labor Regulations
The Supremacy Clause mandates that state and local labor laws yield
to federal regulation.110 State and local governments, however, may
promulgate their own labor laws as long as those laws do not interfere with
the NLRB’s jurisdiction or the Congressional regulation over the
unionizing and collective bargaining of employees.111
Federal labor law preemption comprises two parts—one based on
jurisdiction and the other based on the NLRA occupation of the field of
labor relations.112 The U.S. Supreme Court held in San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon that the NLRB, rather than state courts, has
primary jurisdiction to decide unfair labor practice claims. 113 In Lodge 76,
International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the Supreme Court held
that the NLRA also preempts state law when Congress intended for the
activity to be left to economic forces.114 Therefore, the NLRA preempts
state laws that interfere with the field of labor intended for federal
regulation.115
The Garmon doctrine does not preempt the Seattle Ordinance in Clark
because the plaintiffs in Clark did not allege a valid unfair labor

109. Id.
110. See generally Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
112. Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v.
Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n (Machinists), 427 U.S. 132, 138 (1976).
113. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (“When it is clear or may fairly be assumed
that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due
regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To
leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal
regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by
Congress and requirements imposed by state law.”).
114. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 (“The Court had earlier recognized in preemption cases that Congress meant to leave some activities unregulated and to be
controlled by the free play of economic forces.”).
115. Id.
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practice.116 Instead, Clark implicates the Machinists doctrine and asks
whether the NLRA preempts the regulation of independent contractors’
collective bargaining rights because the NLRA occupies the field of labor
relations in general.117 In Machinists, an employer filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the union and claimed the union member’s refusal
to work overtime violated the NLRA.118 The employer also filed the same
charge with the state employment agency.119 The Supreme Court
concluded that the Congressional intent behind the NLRA preempted the
state regulatory agency from policing the employer–employee
relationship.120 The Congressional intent underlying NLRA regulation is
explicitly stated in the NLRA’s language because Congress defined
employee and labor organization, excluding independent contractors from
coverage.121 If Congress chose not to include a group of workers, or to
specifically exclude a group, the NLRA arguably does not regulate that
group.122
The Seattle Ordinance does not declare that drivers are independent
contractors. Instead, the Seattle Ordinance allows drivers that courts or
legislation may later categorize as independent contractors to unionize.123 If
the NLRA governs the regulation of rideshare drivers, the Seattle Ordinance
is preempted.124 If the NLRA does not govern the regulation of rideshare
drivers, the Seattle Ordinance may be enforceable but still lends itself to
other constitutional arguments, such as First Amendment complications.125
116. Clark v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0382RSL, 2017 WL 3641908, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017). The plaintiffs alleged that the city of Seattle violated
NLRA §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4), which prevent unfair labor practices. However, both
claims were not yet ripe for suit because the drivers were not represented yet, nor
were they engaging in collective bargaining. Id.
117. Id.; see also Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
118. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 133–35.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 149–55. “[T]he crucial inquiry [is] whether Congress intended that
the conduct involved be unregulated because [it is] left ‘to be controlled by the
free play of economic forces.’” Id. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404
U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
122. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. (Brotherhood), 394
U.S. 369, 377 (1969).
123. SEATTLE, WA., MUN. ch. 6.310, § 1(A) (2015).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 152.
125. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend I. Among others, the First Amendment provides
the right to freedom of speech. The Seattle Ordinance may interfere with the
drivers’ freedom of speech because it arguably forces them into a bargaining unit
that may provide opinions on certain issues—some of which the drivers may or
may not agree with.
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This conclusion, however, is still dependent on whether rideshare drivers
are employees or independent contractors.126
1. The Split That Causes Polar Opposite Results
Currently, the Second and Ninth Circuits are split over whether the
NLRA’s definition of labor organization implicates the Machinists
doctrine and allows the NLRA to encompass independent contractor
bargaining units regardless of the NLRA’s exclusion of independent
contractors from the definition of employee.127 Because of this split
between the circuit courts, one circuit could deem the Seattle Ordinance
constitutional and another unconstitutional.128
The Ninth Circuit restricted the definition of labor organization to the
NLRA’s specific language and refused to expand NLRA coverage to
groups beyond the NLRA’s definitions.129 In Pacific Maritime Association
v. Local 63, International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, the
Ninth Circuit—the controlling circuit for Seattle—had to determine
whether there was a violation of the NLRA because of the prohibition on
secondary boycotts.130 The court first had to categorize a “public sector
union” for purposes of NLRA coverage.131 The public sector union in this
case was comprised of a group of Los Angeles port pilots who wanted to
engage in collective bargaining.132 The union represented employees of a
state employee political subdivision; thus, the union did not represent
employees the NLRA covered.133 The Ninth Circuit held that the Los
Angeles port pilots did not constitute an NLRA “labor organization”
because the NLRA’s labor organization definition only includes

126. See generally supra Part I.B.
127. See Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. Local 63, Int’l Longshoremen’s &
Warehousemen’s Union, 198 F.3d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999); Marriott In-Flite
Servs. v. Local 504, Air Transp. Div., Transp. Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 557
F.2d 295, 296 (2d Cir. 1977); see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (defining “labor
organization” as “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose . . . of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work”).
128. See infra Part II.B.
129. Pacific Maritime, 198 F.3d at 1081.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1081–83. A public sector union is one comprised of state employees
or any political subdivision of the state. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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employees.134 The port pilots worked in the public sector and belonged to
another group the NLRA definition of employee specifically excluded.135
The court’s decision allowed the port pilots to organize without running
into preemption issues with the NLRA; therefore, the court reasoned, the
NLRA cannot regulate the unionization of non-employees.136
The Second Circuit faced the same secondary boycott prohibition
issue but reached the opposite conclusion in Marriott In-Flite Services v.
Local 504, Air Transportation Division, Transportation Workers of
America.137 The Second Circuit looked beyond the NLRA’s language and
relied on legislative intent to conclude that groups the NLRA does not
define still fall within the definition of “labor organization” and are
therefore subject to NLRA regulation.138 In Marriott, an employer sued a
local union of airline employees organized under the Railway Labor Act
(“RLA”), a federal statute separate from the NLRA, for damages from a
secondary boycott.139 The Second Circuit considered whether this RLA
union was a labor organization under the NLRA.140 The court relied on
legislative history behind the 1947 amendments to the NLRA in
concluding that the airline employees constituted an NLRA labor
organization and therefore the NLRA could regulate them.141 The court
held that the amendment intended to include groups like the airline
employee union under NLRA coverage, and therefore there was no
preemption issue and the union could be federally regulated.142 As a result,
the airline employees were held to NLRA standards on collective
bargaining.
The Ninth Circuit decided Pacific Maritime after Marriott, noting that
its conclusion was different.143 In highlighting the difference, the Ninth
Circuit cited a Supreme Court case that resolved the question of whether

134. Id.
135. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012). The exclusion of public sector
employees comes from the definition of employer rather than the definition of
employee, whereby the NLRA excludes the U.S. government and any political
subdivision from coverage. Id.
136. Pacific Maritime, 198 F.3d at 1081.
137. Id.
138. Marriott In-Flite Servs. v. Local 504, Air Transp. Div., Transp. Workers
of Am., AFL-CIO, 557 F.2d 295, 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 298–99.
142. Id.
143. Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. Local 63, Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s
Union, 198 F.3d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
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groups the NLRA’s definitions excluded are still considered labor
organizations and preempted the group’s collective bargaining and
unionizing efforts.144
2. The Supreme Court’s Footnote
The 1947 amendments to the NLRA excluded independent
contractors, as well as others, from NLRA coverage.145 In Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, the Supreme Court
stated in a footnote that the 1947 Taft–Hartley amendments to the NLRA
“did not expand the scope of ‘employees’ or ‘labor organizations’ whom
the [NLRA covers].”146 This footnote asserted that the NLRA does not
govern groups that the NLRA’s definition of employee specifically
excludes, and therefore the NLRA does not preempt the groups from
engaging in collective bargaining activities.147 Although the Second
Circuit relied on legislative history, it ignored the Supreme Court’s
restrictive interpretation of employees and labor organizations by
reasoning that the footnote was mere dicta.148 The Second and Ninth
Circuit split, therefore, revolves around whether the Supreme Court made
a binding decision about the preemptive power of the NLRA over
excluded groups. Although the principle is located in a footnote, the
Supreme Court unequivocally stated its opinion on the labor organization
and employee definitions and chose not to expand either.149 Thus, the
Second Circuit should have abided by the Supreme Court’s decision.
The Seattle Ordinance at issue in Clark addresses independent
contractors, a specific group of workers that the 1947 amendments to the
NLRA chose to exclude.150 Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the
Seattle Ordinance does not disrupt Congressional intent or the NLRA’s
statutory language because it only regulates independent contractors the

144. Id.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
146. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377
(1969).
147. Id.
148. Marriott In-Flite Servs. v. Local 504, Air Transp. Div., Transp. Workers
of Am., AFL-CIO, 557 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1977) (“This ambiguous dictum,
contained in a footnote, provides little basis for a major inroad into the national
labor policy against secondary boycotts.”).
149. Brotherhood, 394 U.S. at 377.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 152.
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NLRA does not cover.151 The Seattle Ordinance governs a group of
workers that Congress specifically removed from NLRA coverage, and
therefore, the NLRA does not preempt the Seattle Ordinance.152
Consequently, it is constitutional, and local governments may follow suit
by drafting similar labor laws that regulate rideshare drivers as
independent contractors.153
Similar local regulations, however, will only create confusion for
drivers and rideshare companies because they will have to decipher two
levels of labor regulation: state or local regulation and the NLRA federal
regulation. The workers and rideshare companies will be subject to
organization and collective bargaining in some cities, and possibly states,
but not in others.154
B. The Hardest Question Yet: Regulation
The second issue Clark highlights is whether regulation of the
rideshare industry should occur at the federal, state, or local level.155 Labor
law commentators and experts heavily debate this issue.156 Some
professors argue that filling in gaps in labor regulation should be left to the
states, but others argue that labor regulation should take place at the federal
level.157 Addressing the regulation of rideshare drivers is necessary
because Congress passed the federal labor laws before the advent of the
gig worker, and the laws have not been amended to account for this new
economy.158 Rideshare drivers have since become an important part of the
American workforce; yet the drivers have no protections from
employers.159

151. Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. Local 63, Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s
Union, 198 F.3d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
152. See generally SEATTLE, WA., MUN. ch. 6.310, § 1(A) (2015); 29 U.S.C.
§ 152. This Comment does not address the market participant exception because
Ordinance 124968 is not preempted by the NLRA.
153. See generally Paul M. Secunda & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Workplace
Federalism, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 20 (2008).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See generally Carl Shaffer, Square Pegs Do Not Fit in Round Holes: The
Case for a Third Worker Classification for the Sharing Economy and
Transportation Network Company Drivers, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 1031, 1040 (2017).
159. Molla, supra note 12.
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1. State or Local Regulation Succumbs to the Rideshare Companies’
Political Power
Some labor law experts advocate that state or local laws should
regulate labor relations by filling in the gaps federal law leaves.160
Professor Secunda wrote that state law should fill the gaps that federal
labor regulation leaves open and play a “complementary role.”161
Professor Secunda based his argument on the facts that federal regulation
takes too long to implement162 and that states should have the right to
regulate employee rights because they can act as laboratories in
promulgating workplace laws.163
Although the NLRA does not preempt ordinances like the Seattle
Ordinance, local regulation of rideshare drivers will result in confusion
because of differing regulation for the drivers and rideshare companies per
city or state.164 If every city or state has different regulations, the
protections of rideshare drivers would vary and create inconsistencies.
Under varying bargaining agreements, drivers would have different pay,
hours, and benefits depending on where they work and the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.165 Seattle rideshare drivers would likely
have better working conditions than drivers in a city without labor
regulations because the Seattle drivers are able to engage in collective
bargaining.166 This type of regulation creates inconsistencies within the
rideshare company and among the drivers because each city or state may
subject the company and its drivers to collective bargaining, leading to
different pay, hours, benefits, and protections depending on the collective
bargaining agreement.167
Local regulation of Uber and Lyft could cause the rideshare companies
to take their business elsewhere.168 For example, in May 2016, the city of
160. Secunda & Hirsch, supra note 153, at 29.
161. Id. at 22–30.
162. Id. at 22. Professor Secunda specifically brings attention to the “current
inability of the feds to do anything.” Id. at 30.
163. Id. at 25.
164. Rudy Takala, What’s the government’s role in regulating Uber and Lyft?,
WASH. EXAMINER (May 16, 2016), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/whatsthe-governments-role-in-regulating-uber-and-lyft/article/2590939 [https://perma
.cc/6ZEA-SK2P].
165. Id.
166. SEATTLE, WA., MUN. ch. 6.310, § 2 (2015).
167. Takala, supra note 164.
168. See Avery Hartmans, What happpened to Austin, Texas, when Uber and
Lyft left town, BUS. INSIDER (June 12, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/what-happened-to-austin-texas-when-uber-and-lyft-left-town-2016-6
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Austin passed a local law that required ride-for-hire companies to
fingerprint drivers as a hiring practice.169 Shortly after the law passed,
Uber and Lyft left the city because the law restricted how the companies
do business.170 The city held a repeal referendum that allowed citizens of
Austin to reconsider the local law.171 Uber and Lyft advocated strongly
against the ordinance because it did not allow the companies to hire their
drivers in a timely fashion.172 Ultimately, Uber and Lyft lost, the Austin
law passed, and the rideshare companies left the city.173
Some commentators have argued that local regulations are not a
problem because Austin had a successful transportation system without
Uber and Lyft.174 One year after the enactment, however, Texas Governor
Abbott overturned Austin’s regulation, and Uber and Lyft returned to
Austin.175 After Uber and Lyft lost the local repeal referendum, state
legislators successfully lobbied the governor to overturn the Austin
rideshare regulation after continuous pressure from Uber and Lyft.176
Although Austin’s transportation system survived without Uber and Lyft
for one year, the regulation eventually succumbed to rideshare companies’
ability to lobby state officials.177
Local regulation can cause existing rideshare businesses to leave the
city or use their political power to defeat the local legislation.178 Local
regulation causes Uber and Lyft to become defensive and heavily lobby
state officials because the rideshare companies dislike local regulations

[https://perma.cc/2QTK-QX9Q] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019); but see Stephanie
Riegel, Baton Rouge DUI arrests down nearly 18% in year since Uber entered
market, GREATER BATON ROUGE BUS. REP. (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.business
report.com/business/baton-rouge-dui-arrests-nearly-18-year-since-uber-entered-mar
ket-app-deserves-partial-credit-police-chief-says [https://perma.cc/MEP7-X6XF].
169. Hartmans, supra note 168.
170. Id.
171. Heather Kelly, Uber and Lyft to leave Austin after losing vote on
fingerprinting, CNN MONEY (May 8, 2016, 9:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/20
16/05/08/technology/uber-lyft-austin-vote-fingerprinting/index.htm [https://perma
.cc/K2CC-3LA7].
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Hartmans, supra note 168.
175. David Z. Morris, Uber and Lyft Will Be Back in Austin on Monday,
FORTUNE (May 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/05/28/uber-lyft-austin-texas2/ [https://perma.cc/6PWJ-9RPR].
176. Id.
177. Hartmans, supra note 168.
178. Id.
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that cause policy changes from city to city.179 Ultimately, the companies
dislike inconsistent local regulations and will use political power to lobby
legislators until the legislation is defeated.180 Cities may be able to enforce
regulation of rideshare companies, but the rideshare companies have a
significant interest in preventing or overcoming local regulation if
necessary—as well as the political power to do both.181
2. The Upside of Federal Regulation
Although some scholars argue that city and state laws should govern
labor practices, other scholars contend that federal regulation would
introduce much-needed uniformity.182 Federal programs must be “uniform
in character”; therefore, regulation on the federal level undoubtedly leads
to uniform enforcement and guidelines.183 In addition to uniformity, the
Supreme Court held that state law can sometimes further complicate
federal law objectives when the Court faced a preemption issue in United
States v. Kimbell Foods.184 In Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court
addressed both the preemption and regulation concerns of local or state
regulations, based on the fact that state laws may frustrate the intent behind
the federal regulation, but held that state law took precedent without a
Congressional directive.185
Jeffrey Hirsch, a labor and employment professor and extensive labor
law author, advocates for federal regulation of employment and labor laws

179. Harriett Taylor, What happened in Austin after Uber and Lyft got up and
left, CNBC (Aug. 18, 2016, 12:18 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/18/whathappened-in-austin-after-uber-and-lyft-got-up-and-left.html [https://perma.cc/6P
WJ-9RPR].
180. Morris, supra note 175; Kate Irby, Why New York City’s drunk driving
accidents have gone way down since 2011, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 6, 2017),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article143043959.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7X9-839D]. City or state officials can easily be swayed because
Uber and Lyft have proven useful in decreasing DWI charges.
181. Kelly, supra note 171.
182. Hirsch, supra note 28, at 132–50.
183. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)
(“Undoubtedly, federal programs that ‘by their nature are and must be uniform in
character throughout the Nation’ necessitate formulation of controlling federal
rules.”) (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966)).
184. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (considering whether state law frustrated
the federal program objectives).
185. Id.
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by promoting “vertical integration.”186 Vertical integration would
encompass state law into the federal level.187 Hirsch argues that the federal
government should regulate employment law because federal regulation
results in a single standard, creating simplicity and avoiding uncertainty
for employers.188 In the debate about state or federal level regulation,
Professor Hirsch argues that federal regulation allows for streamlined
rules because there is only one unit of government.189 Federal regulation
allows for straightforward enforcement because a single source of
government regulates nationwide problems through one agency.190
Because federal regulation results in uniform enforcement, Congress
should amend the federal laws that govern collective bargaining rights to
include rideshare drivers. The new American workforce of gig workers
needs uniform acknowledgment and regulation by Congress.191 The
NLRA amendment should act as the starting point to address rideshare
drivers and gig workers in general. With the protection NLRA regulation
provides through unions, gig workers do not need to be included in other
federal labor laws.192 Unions, acting as the drivers’ bargaining
representative, can provide wage and other employment changes through
collective bargaining.193
Without federal regulation, rideshare workers will not be protected,
and employers will be allowed to make unilateral decisions dependent on
the local government’s decision about unionizing.194 Rideshare companies
will continue to settle when faced with lawsuits over the classification and
rights of for-hire drivers; however, federal regulation will stop rideshare
companies from settling by forcing the companies to address the
grievances of drivers through collective bargaining.195

186. Hirsch, supra note 28, at 158 (“Vertical integration would occur by
replacing all state governance of terminations with exclusive federal authority.”).
187. Id. at 99.
188. Id. at 132–50.
189. Secunda & Hirsh, supra note 153, at 37 (“[P]lacing all authority within
one form of government provides a greater opportunity to streamline rules.”).
190. Id.
191. MBO Partners, supra note 11.
192. WILLIAM N. COOKE, Evolution of the National Labor Relations Act, in
UNION ORGANIZING AND PUBLIC POLICY: FAILURE TO SECURE FIRST CONTRACTS
1, 1–21 (1985).
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Complaint at 6–9, Van v. Rasier, L.L.C., No. 2:17-CV-02550,
2017 WL 1278763 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017).
195. Heather Sumerville, Judge approves $27 million driver settlement in Lyft
lawsuit, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17
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Federal regulation in other areas, such as medical leave, overtime, and
wage provisions, has yielded desirable results.196 Congress passed the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in 1993, allowing workers to
take unpaid medical leave without repercussions.197 Prior to the FMLA,
only 34 states had some type of family leave legislation with just 12 of
those states providing job-protected medical or family leave.198 The
FMLA’s biggest hurdle was Congressional recognition of the changing
American workforce and its need for protection.199 In the 1980s and 1990s,
the workforce change was a “revolutionary influx of women into the
workforce.”200 Women became significant contributors to household
income and a vital part of the American workforce.201 Although states can
and do grant greater protections for workers than the FMLA provides,202
the FMLA supplied an essential federal floor for both the recognition and
protection of women as emerging American workers and created uniform
federal legislation where state regulation lacked.203
Similar to the regulation of family medical leave, the federal
government should regulate for-hire drivers to provide uniformity for both
the drivers and businesses. Like the influx of female workers in the 1980s
and 1990s, recent years have shown an increase in rideshare drivers.204
Federal regulation of rideshare workers arguably recognizes a new and
integral part of the American workforce and provides protections for those
workers.205 The drivers and rideshare companies will know the designated
pay, benefits, and union-organizing parameters for all locations rather than

/judge-approves-27-million-driver-settlement-in-lyft-lawsuit.html [https://perma
.cc/C8AT-H7ZD]; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
196. See, e.g., EPA History, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa
.gov/history#timeline [https://perma.cc/ZM7Q-GQ43] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 2615.
198. Jane Waldfogel, Family leave coverage in the 1990s, MONTHLY LAB.
REV. (Oct. 1999), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1999/10/art2full.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/A7ZD-JN8T].
199. Donna R. Lenoff & Lissa Bell, Government Support for Working
Families and for Communities: Family and Medical Leave Act as a Case Study,
NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, http://www.nationalpartnership
.org/research-library/work-family/fmla/fmla-case-study-lenhoff-bell.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9XCC-C865].
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 246 (West 2017).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012).
204. MBO Partners, supra note 11.
205. Hirsch, supra note 28.
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having to decipher the regulation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.206
Federal regulation allows drivers and businesses alike to rely on one
source of labor regulation rather than the varying laws of countless cities
or states.207
Additionally, if rideshare drivers can organize and bargain, workers
do not need the protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),
FMLA, and other labor regulations.208 The drivers can negotiate through
unions to protect themselves from potential violations of other labor
laws.209 Congress passed minimum wage and medical leave laws initially
because of the large percentage of workers unions do not represent.210
Drivers’ collective bargaining rights ensure a new class of workers are
protected without the promulgation of new law. The solution begins with
the NLRA, but it can filter into other employment laws as time passes and
the need arises to amend other federal laws.211
III. THE FIRST STEP
There are three possible solutions to the issue of regulating rideshare
drivers: (1) to include independent contractors under NLRA coverage; (2)
to declare a middle-ground status between independent contractors and
employees; or (3) to amend the NLRA to include gig workers in the
definition of employee. An NLRA amendment is the best solution because
it recognizes the importance of gig workers and provides protections for
rideshare drivers.212
A. The Inclusion of Independent Contractors
One solution is to amend the NLRA to once again include independent
contractors as employees. In 1947, Congress passed the Taft–Hartley Act,
which amended the NLRA to exclude specifically independent

206. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2612.
207. Hirsch, supra note 28, at 132–50.
208. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2612; see also Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e). Rideshare drivers will be able to combat employer decisions
through collective bargaining as opposed to relying on different federal labor
statutes for protection. Collective bargaining and their representative union will
ensure employees’ grievances are heard and brought to the employer when the
union is negotiating. Id.
209. See, e.g., RAISE UP UBER, supra note 88.
210. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2615.
211. COOKE, supra note 192, at 1–21.
212. See generally Council Directive 2008/104, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 327) (EC).
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contractors.213 Congress excluded independent contractors because of the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Silk.214 In Silk, the Supreme
Court decided whether coal “unloaders” and truckers were employees or
independent contractors; the Court ultimately held that the unloaders were
employees and the truckers independent contractors because of their
“economic realities.”215 The economic realities test, replacing earlier tests,
relies on “economic facts,” such as employer control and type of work, to
determine whether the relationship is one of employment or an
independent business enterprise.216 After Silk, big business advocates
lobbied Congress successfully to exclude independent contractors, with
Congress relying heavily on the Silk economic realities test to decide that
independent contractors did not qualify for NLRA protections.217
An amendment to the NLRA including independent contractors would
be reflective of the recent increase in gig workers.218 Simply including all
independent contractors, however, is nearly impossible. Big businesses
benefit from hiring independent contractors, and business owners do not
want every independent contractor to have NLRA rights.219 Independent
contractor status allows businesses to avoid employer-provided benefits,
taxes, and workers’ compensation insurance.220 The Taft–Hartley
amendments that excluded independent contractors were a direct result of
big business pressure to balance out the previous NLRA restrictions placed

213. DAVEY ET AL., supra note 39, at 33.
214. Blake E. Stafford, Riding the Line Between “Employee” and
“Independent Contractor” in the Modern Sharing Economy, 51 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1223, 1227 (2016).
215. Id.
216. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 128 (1944) (“[W]hen . . . the
economic facts of the relation make it more nearly one of employment than of
independent business enterprise . . . those characteristics may outweigh technical
legal classification for purposes unrelated to the statute’s objectives and bring the
relation within its protections.”).
217. Stafford, supra note 214, at 1227–28.
218. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012).
219. Jack Barbash, Unions and Rights in the Space Age, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/chapter6.htm [https://perma.cc/4V
XU-CLRM] (last visited Dec. 18, 2018).
220. Stephen Fishman, Pros and Cons of Hiring Independent Contractors,
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/pros-cons-hiring-independentcontractors-30053.html [https://perma.cc/6MSR-HZXY] (last visited Dec. 18,
2018).
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on employers.221 The amendments aimed to balance the interests of
employers with the interest of unions.222 Additionally, an amendment to
the NLRA that includes all independent contractors may not be politically
viable because pro-employer and pro-union groups are constantly
fighting.223 NLRA legislation is a consistent push and pull of employer
and union efforts to provide the best legislation for the corresponding
side.224 Including all independent contractors could create a domino effect,
as the regulation would likely overlap with other federal statutes related to
employment, like the FLSA and Title VII. This result would be hard to
predict and could affect minimum wage or workplace discrimination.225
B. Declaring a Middle Ground
As opposed to including all independent contractors, Congress could
declare a hybrid or middle-ground status for gig workers.226 A hybrid
status would land between the classification of employee and independent
contractor.227 “Dependent contractor” status is a middle ground between
employee and independent contractor, which allows workers to depend on
their employer but still maintain some control over their employment.228
Recent employment law scholarship proposes that Uber and Lyft drivers
should be considered dependent contractors under the FLSA, which
provides worker protections such as minimum wage.229 Declaring
dependent contractor status alone, however, does not solve the problem of
221. Jonathan Fox Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A Comparative Analysis
of the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the
Hope for the NLRA’s Future, 13 CUNY L. REV. 107, 109 (2009).
222. DAVEY ET AL., supra note 39, at 33.
223. Id.
224. Id. In 1947, the Taft–Hartley amendments represented a push by employers
to balance out the rights given to unions in the NLRA’s passing. In 1959, the
Landrum–Griffin amendments, however, signaled a pull back by unions restricting
the rights of employers once again. Id.; see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153 (2012).
225. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 202; 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
226. Megan Carboni, A New Class of Worker for the Sharing Economy, 22
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2016).
227. Id.
228. Easton Saltsman, A Free Market Approach to the Rideshare Industry and
Worker Classification: The Consequences of Employee Status and a Proposed
Alternative, 13 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 209, 230–31 (2017) (considering that
dependent contractor status would allow workers to have control over employee
benefits, such as severance packages, while employers retain control over hours
and wages).
229. Id.
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for-hire drivers’ collective bargaining rights.230 Simply identifying a new
type of worker without legislation causes more uncertainty about gig
workers’ employment status because it is still unclear whether workers in
the rideshare industry fit within the NLRA’s definition of employee.231
C. An Amendment to Include Gig Workers
Instead of including independent contractors or declaring a hybrid
category, Congress should amend the NLRA’s definition of employee to
include gig workers under NLRA protections. Amending the NLRA’s
definition of employee is the most ideal solution because gig workers are
a substantial part of the American workforce. Further, employers can
continue to hire independent contractors, and the amendment ends the
ongoing classification debate. The NLRA amendment should read: “The
term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, as well as any worker that
relies on smartphone applications to complete an on-demand service and
may perform this work for a temporary or inconsistent basis.”
1. Gig Workers Here to Stay
This amendment strikes the perfect balance between protecting gig
workers and recognizing the benefits employers gain from hiring
independent contractors.232 Including gig workers in the NLRA recognizes
a growing part of the American workforce and gives gig workers the
chance to effectively defend their rights under labor laws, as well as
providing a foundation for protections under other federal labor laws.233 A
study by Intuit predicts that the amount of Americans working in the ondemand economy will double by 2020 with 43% of the American
workforce becoming a part of the on-demand economy.234 The shift in the
American job economy toward gig work will continue as more Americans
seek the benefits of extra pay from side jobs.235 Gig workers are a different
class of independent contractors from the independent contractors

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See generally 29 U.S.C. § 152.
Saltsman, supra note 228.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
Intuit Forecast: 7.6 Million People in On-Demand Economy by 2020,
INTUIT (Aug. 13, 2015), http://investors.intuit.com/press-releases/press-releasedetails/2015/Intuit-Forecast-76-Million-People-in-On-Demand-Economy-by-20
20/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/2RGU-YJRQ].
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contemplated when Congress passed the NLRA.236 To protect gig workers,
the NLRA definition of employee should specifically encompass this
growing part of the American workforce.
2. Employers Still Win
Rideshare companies do not want rideshare drivers to be classified as
employees because the status as independent contractors allows the
companies to maximize profit.237 Uber and Lyft’s business models rely on
drivers being independent contractors because the companies maximize
profit by not providing benefits or workers insurance.238 Additionally,
rideshare companies are not liable for payroll taxes or negligent acts by
independent contractor drivers.239 The amendment only includes gig
workers under NLRA regulations. Rideshare companies, therefore, may
still avoid NLRA regulation and other federal employment regulations—
like the FMLA and the FLSA—by hiring drivers specifically deemed as
independent contractors.240 The benefit of hiring independent contractors
is why employers passionately lobbied to exclude independent contractors
from the NLRA’s definition of employee.241 Amending the NLRA
definition of employee to include gig workers still allows employers to
hire independent contractors that are not gig workers without
repercussions; employers will be restricted only in their treatment of gig
workers.242
3. NLRA was Always the Starting Point
Including gig workers specifically in the NLRA definition of
employee begins to resolve the dispute over rideshare drivers’
classification and is a starting point for protecting gig workers.243 Congress
passed the NLRA to protect private sector rights and later passed the FLSA

236. Id.
237. Fishman, supra note 220.
238. Maya Kosoff, How two lawsuits could destroy Uber and Lyft’s business
models – and set a precedent for the rest of the sharing economy, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 12, 2015, 10:12 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-businessmodels-and-lawsuits-2015-3 [https://perma.cc/6UYG-SU5X].
239. Fishman, supra note 220.
240. Taylor English Duma, Preventing Independent Contractors From
Becoming Full-Fledged Employees, 28 No. 5 GA. EMP. L. LETTER 7 (2015).
241. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
242. Id.
243. See supra Part I.B.
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and FMLA to address the issues left unprotected by the NLRA.244 Just as
the NLRA laid the foundation to protect private sector workers’ rights, the
amendment would create protections for America’s new class of
workers.245 An NLRA definition of gig workers must be within the
definition of employee to fully protect rideshare drivers’ collective
bargaining rights.246 An amendment of the NLRA definition gives gig
workers a freestanding definition within the classification of employee for
purposes of labor rights.247 Additionally, Congress and states may
continue to provide more protection through other statutes.248
4. Mirroring the European Union
European Union labor laws, in contrast to U.S. labor law, yields a very
progressive union-friendly workforce.249 The European Commission is
tasked with promulgating and amending labor laws that provide worker
rights and freedoms.250 The amendment should mirror the objectives
behind the European Union’s 2008 Directive on Temporary Agency Work
(“Directive”).251 The Directive aimed to balance the protections of
temporary workers with the reality that employers have specific reasons
to employ workers or contract out the work.252 Congress should amend the
NLRA’s definition of employee to include “any worker that relies on
smartphone applications to complete an on-demand service and may
perform this work on a temporary or inconsistent basis.” This amendment
accomplishes goals similar to those the European Union’s Directive
achieved.253 After the European Union passed the Directive, a new type of
244. COOKE, supra note 192.
245. Id.
246. See 29 U.S.C. § 152.
247. COOKE, supra note 192; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152.
248. COOKE, supra note 192; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152.
249. Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec
.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157 [https://perma.cc/Q3A3-YN6U] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2019).
250. Id.
251. See generally Council Directive 2008/104, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 327) (EC).
252. Working Conditions - Temporary Agency Workers, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706&langId=en&intPageId=207 [https://
perma.cc/63UD-YJFT] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) (“The Directive aims to guarantee
a minimum level of effective protection to temporary workers and to contribute to
the development of the temporary work sector as a flexible option for employers
and workers.”).
253. Council Directive 2008/104, art. 3(1)(c), 2008 O.J. (L 327) (EC). The
Directive defines temporary agency worker as “a worker with a contract of
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worker was recognized and given significant protections.254 Likewise, the
amendment would allow gig workers to engage in collective bargaining
without opening the flood gates to all independent contractors.255
Amending the definition of employee to encompass gig workers
presents similar political problems as amending the NLRA to include
independent contractors.256 Including gig workers in the definition of
employee, however, is the middle-ground. Amending the definition of
employee allows for federal regulation of workers that need to be protected
but also provides businesses the opportunity to oppose unions through the
election process. The amendment would still allow businesses to reap the
benefits of employing independent contractors other than gig workers
because they remain excluded from NLRA protections. Additionally, gig
workers would remain excluded from the protections of other labor laws.
Amending the definition of employee to include gig workers is the best
solution for solving the labor law preemption and regulatory issues
presented in Clark.257 Until then, local ordinances allowing cities to
promulgate their own classification of Uber and Lyft drivers are
constitutional, and this discrepancy leads to problematic regulation on a
city-by-city or state-by-state basis.
CONCLUSION
In Clark, a Washington district court ruled on a local labor law that
was designed to be the first of its kind.258 The court discussed labor law
preemption and regulation issues that have been part of an ongoing
national debate. Uber and Lyft drivers represent a new group of “gig
workers” who are part of the employee versus independent contractor
classification debate and do not have collective bargaining rights or
protections.259 The Seattle Ordinance, however, represents a local measure
that successfully created a workaround for the misclassification debate that
allowed drivers who are independent contractors to engage in collective

employment or an employment relationship with a temporary-work agency with
a view to being assigned to a user undertaking to work temporarily under its
supervision and direction.” Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See supra Part II.A.
257. Clark v. City of Seattle, No. C17-0382RSL, 2017 WL 3641908, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2017).
258. Id.
259. Intuit Forecast, supra note 235.
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bargaining and unionizing.260 No matter what classification ride-for-hire
drivers are given, therefore, the drivers can engage in collective bargaining
and union representation.
The best solution to the regulation issue concerning rideshare drivers
is to amend the NLRA’s employee definition to include gig workers. An
amendment would recognize a growing part of the American workforce,
allow employers to continue benefitting from hiring independent
contractors, and end the ongoing debate concerning whether rideshare
drivers are employees or independent contractors.261 The amendment
would accomplish two important goals: recognition of the new workforce
and the opportunity for drivers to engage in collective bargaining to protect
themselves from adverse employer decisions.
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